Localities as Equality Innovators by Lenhardt, Robin A.
Fordham Law School
FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History
Faculty Scholarship
2011
Localities as Equality Innovators
Robin A. Lenhardt
Fordham University School of Law, rlenhardt@law.fordham.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
Robin A. Lenhardt, Localities as Equality Innovators, 7 Stan. J. C.R. & C.L. 265 (2011)
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship/459
ARTICLE
LOCALITIES AS EQUALITY INNOVATORS
R.A. Lenhardtt
IN TRO D U CT IO N .............................................................................................................. 2 6 5
I. LOCALITIES AND EQUALITY INNOVATION ............................................................. 270
II. JUDICIAL CONSTRAINTS ON INNOVATION IN THE RACE CONTEXT .................. 275
III. STRUCTURAL APPROACHES TO RACIAL INEQUALITY ...................................... 278
A. Existing Regulatory Innovations ...................................................... 279
B. A Modest Proposal: The Race Audit Device ................................. 281
C. Developing Better Solutions for Structural Racial
In eq u ality ............................................................................................... 2 8 5
D. Strengthening Local Incentives for Innovation ......................... 287
C O N CLU SIO N ................................................................................................................... 2 9 0
INTRODUCTION
Broadcast images of young African American civil rights protesters
being battered by water from high-pressure fire hoses served as a turning point
in the grassroots movement for racial equality and a catalyst for the enactment
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1 The decision of Bull Connor, Birmingham,
1 Associate Professor of Law, Fordham Law School. In developing the ideas discussed in
this article, I have benefitted from useful comments from and numerous conversations with
colleagues, including Michelle Adams, Rick Banks, David Barron, Elise Boddie, Devon
Cardado, Guy Charles, Nestor Davidson, Richard Ford, Sheila Foster, Katherine Franke,
Jeanne Fromer, Jerry Frug, Suzanne Goldberg, Rachel Godsil, Jennifer Gordon, Kristin
Johnson, Olati Johnson, Sonia Katyal, Catherine Powell, Aaron Saiger, Susan Sturm, and
Benjamin Zipursky. My thanks to Ernestine Narcisse and the Fordham Law School Library
staff for helpful research assistance, and to Christopher Hu and the other members of the
Stanford Journal of Civil Rights & Civil Liberties, for their hard work on this article and the
symposium of which it was a part.
1. See Michael J. Klarman, Brown at 50, 90 VA. L. REv. 1613, 1628 (2004)(discussing Bull Connor and his violence as catalyst for the Civil Rights Act of 1964); see
also Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Race as Identity Caricature: A Local Legal History Lesson in
266 STANFORD JOURNAL OF CIVIL RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES [VII:2
Alabama's former Public Safety Commissioner, to attack civil rights protesters
in so brutal a manner came to signify the evils of Jim Crow segregation and its
systematic subjugation of black Americans.2 In a way few would have
predicted at the time, Bull Connor's actions, and others taken by local and state
officials throughout the South and in some areas of the North, also worked, in
no small measure, to shape modem United States Supreme Court jurisprudence
in the area of race. 3 This is so in part because the Court found itself so often
confronted with local defiance to racial segregation in countless cases in the
decades following its landmark decision in Brown v. Board of Education.
4
There has evolved in post-Brown cases a negative understanding of localities-
what I call the "bad city" image-that now applies across a variety of contexts.
The image certainly (and quite properly) gets evoked in cases involving
racially segregative state action intended to disadvantage racial minorities.5 But
it has not been confined to such cases. Under strict scrutiny, the Court now
effectively treats as "bad cities" even those localities that seek affirmatively to
promote equality and eliminate persistent racial disparities through their
initiatives.
6
Recent decisions such as Parents Involved in Community Schools v.
Seattle School District No. 17 and Ricci v. DeStefano8 help to illustrate the
point. In those cases, conservative justices invalidated local programs or policy
decisions designed to address racial disparities: Seattle- and Louisville-based
school assignment programs geared toward reducing the effects of
resegregation in the former case, and the City of New Haven's judgment that
compliance with federal antidiscrimination law required the invalidation of test
results that would have exacerbated racial imbalances in a fire department with
a long history of racial exclusivity in the latter.9 Citing the dangers of race-
conscious decision making, the Parents Involved and Ricci courts declined to
afford local actors the deference that, ironically, had been forthcoming even in
early cases challenging bedrock components of the Jim Crow system.
10
Legal scholars have long decried the empty formalism inherent in the
the Salience of Intraracial Conflict, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1913 (2003) (discussing Connor's
response).
2. Gilda R. Daniels, Senator Edward Kennedy: A Lion for Voting Rights, 14 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 415, 433 n. 104 (2011) (discussing Connor as symbol of civil rights
abuses).
3. See R.A. Lenhardt, Race Audits, 62 HASTINGS L.J. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript
at 4-5) (on file with author).
4. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
5. Lenhardt, supra note 3, at 4-5.
6. Id.
7. 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
8. 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
9. Lenhardt, supra note 3, at 4-5.
10. Id. at4-6.
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Rehnquist and Roberts Courts' determination to equate local policies designed
to disadvantage racial minorities with those designed to promote equality for
all." In this Article, I explore what the Court's formalistic stance means for
localities and possible innovations in addressing persistent racial disparities in
areas such as education, housing, employment, health care, and criminal
justice. Admittedly, one would be hard pressed to find the words "race" and
"innovation" being used in conjunction with one another in any of the Court's
cases. The Court's hostility to affirmative action and its insistence on treating
ongoing structural racial inequalities as "societal discrimination" that cannot
constitutionally be redressed through race-conscious means have dramatically
limited opportunities for creativity in dealing with the problems of the modem
color line. 2 Even more, they have severely circumscribed the role of localities
in this context. Courts, not the local officials whose on-the-ground experience
and expertise have been celebrated as the cornerstone of democracy in other
areas of the law,' 3 now dictate how much or, more accurately, how little cities
and other localities can accomplish in meaningfully addressing racial
inequalities that divide their communities and, research increasingly shows,
effect a drag on their long-term economic prospects.1
4
11. See, e.g., Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Affirmative Action and Colorblindness from the
Original Position, 78 TUL. L. REV. 2009 (2004); Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Race,
Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law,
101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution Is Color-
Blind, " 44 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1991); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal
Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); Ian F.
Haney L6pez, "A Nation of Minorities ": Race, Ethnicity, and Reactionary Colorblindness,
59 STAN. L. REV. 985 (2007); Reva B. Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law: How
"Color Blindness" Discourse Disrupts and Rationalizes Social Stratification, 88 CALIF. L.
REV. 77 (2000).
12. Lenhardt, supra note 3, at 5-6; see also GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, THE LAW OF
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON RACE AND
REMEDIES 2 (2000). The Court has consistently regarded "societal discrimination" as too
amorphous a concept to recognize as a constitutional injury. See, e.g., City of Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 497 (1989) (plurality opinion); Regents of the Univ. of Cal.
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 296 (1978) (describing societal discrimination as a "social injury"
too insignificant to warrant a race-based remedy). For more on societal discrimination, see
Michael Selmi, Remedying Societal Discrimination Through the Spending Clause, 80 N.C.
L. Rev. 1575 (2002).
13. See, e.g., United Haulers Ass'n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt.
Auth., 550 U.S. 330 (2007) (waste management); Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1
(1974) (zoning decisions); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)
(education).
14. For research indicating that addressing racial inequality can have a positive impact
on a locality's bottom-line, see ROBERT WEISSBOURD, STRENGTHENING COMMUNITIES FOR
REGIONAL PROSPERITY 4-5 (2006), available at http://www.rw-
ventures.com/publications/downloads/StrengtheningCommunities.pdf (indicating, inter
alia, that one study on this issue "shows that cities with higher poverty rates face higher per
capita costs not only for poverty-related programs, but also for non-poverty-related
expenditures including general government functions").
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The recalcitrance of localities, such as Birmingham, in the wake of
Brown necessitated judicial oversight of this sort. But it is not at all clear that
we still need courts to occupy so much of the field when it comes to
determining the most effective ways to navigate the racial divide today.
Obviously, racial discrimination still exists. In particular, official race-based
discrimination remains a serious problem against which we must continue to
guard. Incidents such as those that transpired in Tulia, Texas, where law
enforcement officials were shown effectively to have engaged in race-based
prosecution of nearly fifty African Americans charged in connection with a
drug sting, make this clear. 15 At the same time, we now have case law and
federal, state, and local antidiscrimination statutes on the books that establish
norms and baseline protections against racial discrimination in a range of areas
that simply did not exist when Bull Connor and others used their public offices
to deny African American citizens the equal treatment and opportunity
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. With proper enforcement, these
laws place meaningful limits on facially discriminatory government policies
and programs.16
Further, the overall effectiveness of the Supreme Court's interventions
in the race context has been limited. The judicial preoccupation with the
eradication of intentional racial discrimination evident in modem cases-
manifested in a norm of colorblindness so expansive that, after Ricci, some
maintain that it prohibits the mere awareness of race' 7 -may have helped to
place limits on overtly discriminatory government programs. It has, however,
done little, if anything, to address the source of persistent inequalities in core
areas. 18 Many of the justices whose vision of race and discrimination has
prevailed in recent cases would no doubt insist that any lingering disparities
could be attributed to perfectly "natural" individual choices 19 or perhaps even
the failings of the affected minorities themselves, rather than to existing
15. For a discussion of the Tulia, Texas case and the efforts made to bring justice to
those victimized, see Kevin R. Johnson, Taking the "Garbage" Out in Tulia, Texas: The
Taboo on Black- White Romance and Racial Profiling in the "War on Drugs, " 2007 Wis. L.
REV. 283 (2007).
16. But see Goodwin Liu, The Bush Administration and Civil Rights: Lessons Learned,
4 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 77, 78-86 (2009) (pointing out that civil rights
enforcement has sometimes been inadequate, such as during the Bush administration).
17. See, e.g., Michelle Adams, Is Integration a Discriminatory Purpose?, 96 IOWA L.
REV. 837, 840-41 (2011) (arguing that, after Ricci, the mere consideration of race for any
purpose might invoke strict scrutiny). But see Elise C. Boddie, The Way Forward: Racial
Integration After Ricci, a Response to Michelle Adams, IOWA L. REV. BULL. (forthcoming
2011) (manuscript at 2-3, 10) (on file with author) (arguing that Ricci's reach is relatively
limited and, in any event, does not prohibit all race-conscious goals or purposes).
18. See Lenhardt, supra note 3, at 3.
19. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
736 (2007) (plurality opinion); see also id. at 750 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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doctrine. But a growing body of scholarship suggests otherwise. Legal
scholars, historians, and social scientists increasingly point to the need to
interrogate more fully the systems and structures that could explain such
"durable inequality." 21 Structuralist accounts of race "shift[] our attention"
from intentionality or "intra-institutional"-based analyses-favorites of the
current Court-to interrogations of "inter-institutional arrangements and
interactions" that better explain the cumulative and multi-generational nature of
22racial disadvantage. They make clear that an exclusive focus on
intentionality, by definition, will always be inadequate to address persistent
racial inequalities.
23
This Article thus argues that instead of regarding cities and localities
that, like Seattle and Louisville, try to develop serious solutions to existing
racial disparities as "bad cities" no different from those whose notorious
policies spurred the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s, we should
be regarding them as potential "equality innovators., 24 Their on-the-ground
experience with the realities of race and its operation in the twenty-first century
arguably places them in a better position than courts to develop innovative
approaches to the structural racial inequities with which so many municipalities
must grapple. Existing doctrine limits dramatically the ability of courts to
confront in any meaningful way how localities and the people that inhabit them
actually navigate race.
Part I develops the concept of local "equality innovators" by first
-detailing the parameters of the intellectual property term "user innovation"
from which it takes its inspiration, and then considering theoretical support for
extending opportunities for innovation from the individual user to the
institutional context. Part II takes a closer look at existing judicial barriers to
locality-generated innovation, briefly discussing recent cases and the emphasis
on "race-neutral alternatives" in Supreme Court jurisprudence. Part III begins
20. Abigail and Stephen Themstrom have been vocal advocates of the latter position in
conservative circles. See, e.g., ABIGAIL THERNSTROM & STEPHAN THERNSTROM, No
EXCUSES: CLOSING THE RACIAL GAP IN LEARNING 4-5 (2003) (advancing claim that the
educational achievement gap reflect cultural deficiencies in African American and Latino
students and families).
21. See CHARLES TILLY, DURABLE INEQUALITY (1998) (developing the term "durable
inequality"). For further examples of such scholarship, see COLIN GORDON, MAPPING
DECLINE: ST. LouIs AND THE FATE OF THE AMERICAN CITY (2008); IRA KATZNELSON, WHEN
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS WHITE: AN UNTOLD HISTORY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN
TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (2005); DOUGLAS S. MASSEY, CATEGORICALLY UNEQUAL:
THE AMERICAN STRATIFICATION SYSTEM, at xv (2007); john a. powell, Structural Racism:
Building upon the Insights of John Calmore, 86 N.C. L. REV. 791, 796 (2008); Susan Sturm,
Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L.
REV. 458 (2001).
22. powell, supra note 21, at 796.
23. Id.
24. Lenhardt, supra note 3, at 62.
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by identifying examples of innovative regulatory devices that, consistent with
the calls of many legal scholars, focus on structural barriers to racial equality,
rather than on intentional racial discrimination alone. It then advances a broad
proposal that could be deployed by localities, even within the narrow confines
of existing doctrine, to respond more effectively to the structural sources of
persistent racial inequality. It outlines some of the benefits that the race audit
proposal, which I introduce more fully in an article in the Hastings Law
Journal,25 might have for encouraging innovation in the race context. The
article concludes by briefly addressing potential concerns raised by the race
audit proposal. It also situates this Article in a larger project on civil rights in
the twenty-first century in which I am engaged.
I. LOCALITIES AND EQUALITY INNOVATION
In his 2011 State of the Union address, President Barack Obama talked
about the need to enhance American innovation. 26 Areas such as business and
education made the list of sites where innovative new strategies could be
effectively deployed to improve the nation's competitiveness and help pull the
country out of the worst recession in a generation. 27 Civil rights and racial
equality, notably, did not.
For those who, as I do, find it hard to ignore matters of race when
assessing the current economic crisis, the omission was striking. It was,
however, hardly surprising, even setting aside the political considerations that
no doubt played a significant role in shaping the speech. The truth is that,
unlike in areas such as business, science, technology, and education, we have
no real innovation norms in the race context. In fact, as I explain in greater
detail in Part II, the Court has actively discouraged meaningful efforts to
innovate or experiment in this context.28 Localities and other government
entities have been cast as obstacles to productive change, rather than the
potential sources of it. Nevertheless, I contend that we should be looking for
ways to innovate and to place localities more and more at the center of such
efforts.
In the absence of strong innovation norms in the race context, it makes
sense to consider other areas where theories pertaining to experimentation and
innovation have been better developed. The intellectual property context
provides an ideal starting point. There, of course, legal scholars have long
25. See Lenhardt, supra note 3.
26. Peter Grier, Obama State of the Union 2011: U.S. Must 'Win the Future' Through
Innovation, CHRISTIAN Sci. MONITOR, Jan. 26, 2011,
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2011/0126/Obama-State-of-the-Union-20 11 -US-
must-win-the-future-through-innovation.
27. See id
28. See infra p. 277.
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debated the "socially desirable level of protection provided by intellectual
property rights" necessary to encourage the development of intellectual
goods.29 Attention has most often been trained on the producers or
manufacturers of such goods, who necessarily operated in a "closed way, ....
using patents, copyrights, and other protections to prevent imitators from free
riding on their innovation investments." 30 Increasingly, however, scholars have
begun to study and develop ways to understand the phenomenon of user
innovation.
31
"User innovation" refers to the modification of mass-produced goods by
consumers able to satisfy specific product needs or tastes without the assistance
or acquiescence of manufacturers. 32 At some level people have, as William
Fisher notes in a recent article, long found it necessary-for reasons of
functionality or pure aesthetics-to modify mass-produced items such as cars,
shoes, or even fishing equipment to suit their particular needs.33 The inclination
that leads one to "supe up" a vintage car or alter a bicycle can hardly be called
new.34 But user-based innovation has become increasingly prevalent or, as Eric
von Hippel contends in his book on this subject, "democratized., 35
Technological advances in areas such as computer software and gaming, digital
media, and biotechnology have made it much easier and productive for
consumers to modify existing products for personal use and, in some instances,
redistribution.36 Think, for example, about recent controversies surrounding
"digital mashups... combining audio, video, graphical, or textual material
29. Jonathan M. Barnett, Is Intellectual Property Trivial?, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1691,
1692 (2009).
30. ERIC VON HIPPEL, DEMOCRATIZING INNOVATION 2 (2005).
31. See, e.g., id; William W. Fisher III, The Implications for Law of User Innovation,
94 MINN. L. REV. 1417, 1441-46 (2010) (discussing the challenges user innovation poses for
law); Katherine J. Strandburg, Evolving Innovation Paradigms and the Global Intellectual
Property Regime, 41 CONN. L. REV. 861 (2009) [hereinafter Strandburg, Evolving
Innovation] (discussing the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
and the extent to which innovations in use of certain technologies have outpaced conceptions
of existing intellectual property models); Katherine J. Strandburg, User Innovator
Community Norms: At the Boundary Between Academic and Industry Research, 77
FORDHAM L. REV. 2237 (2009) [hereinafter Strandburg, User Innovator Community Norms]
(discussing methods of technology sharing and academic research that raise issues for patent
law).
32. Fisher, supra note 31, at 1418-30.
33. Id.
34. See Strandburg, Evolving Innovation, supra note 31, at 873-74.
35. VON HIPPEL, supra note 30, at 1, 121-3 1.
36. See id Oftentimes, the desire to redistribute such goods represents, as Professors
Eduardo Pefialver and Sonia Katyal discuss in their recent book, a protest against operative
rules about ownership or use. See EDUARDO MOISES PEI&ALVER & SONIA K. KATYAL,
PROPERTY OUTLAWS: How SQUATTERS, PIRATES, AND PROTESTERS IMPROVE THE LAW OF
OWNERSHIP (2010).
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from preexisting works into new digital works," 37 which, for example, occur
frequently in rap music, 38 or the prevalence of "gamer"-inspired alterations and
sharing of mass-produced computer games. 39 These and other similar user
innovations create tensions within existing intellectual property law, which
may or may not incorporate norms about sharing or modification,40 and require
courts and scholars alike to reconsider existing rules about product use and
innovation.4 1
User innovation becomes possible because of two important factors:
localized, user-specific information and knowledge about a product, and the
capacity of users to carry out innovations.42 Producers, not surprisingly, have
mixed views of the innovations these factors make possible.43 Some plainly
view it as an encroachment on intellectual property rights protected by patent
or copyright law. But even this reaction provides useful information for our
purposes here. Underlying the debate is the recognition that user innovation
produces value and concrete benefits. 44 Some of these benefits, like the idea
that such innovation has positive redistribution effects and promotes self-
determination and expression, arguably obtain primarily at the individual user
level.45 Others, such as the idea that inventions in this context enhance overall
efficiency and, assuming an operational distribution and rights scheme, can
make the product more widely available extend more broadly, as the fact that
many producers ultimately seek either to encourage or facilitate user-level
innovations for the own purposes suggests.
4 6
Obviously, courts are not manufacturers, and localities are not users in
the traditional sense. It strikes me, though, that an argument can be made for
formally recognizing the capacity that cities and other localities have to be
"equality innovators," and to engage in productive experimentation and
innovation in the area of race that helps to address underlying public systems
and structures that result in broad-scale inequality.47 Like some producers of
technological goods, courts are somewhat removed from the day-to-day reality
37. Fisher, supra note 31, at 1418.
38. PENALVER & KATYAL, supra note 36, at 208-26 (discussing The Grey Album,
which incorporated digital content from the Beatles's The White Album with rapper Jay-Z's
The Black Album); see also Fisher, supra note 31, at 1418-19 (same).
39. See Fisher, supra note 31, at 1421-22 (noting that player modification of computer
games has become so commonplace that producers of some products now sometimes
provide player tool kits to facilitate modifications and sharing).
40. See Strandburg, Evolving Innovation, supra note 31, at 861; Strandburg, User
Innovator Community Norms, supra note 31, at 2237-38.
41. Fisher, supra note 31, at 1472-76.
42. Strandburg, Evolving Innovation, supra note 31, at 874.
43. Fisher, supra note 31, at 1435-41.
44. VON HIPPEL, supra note 30, at 2, 9, 123.
45. See id. at 122-23.
46. Id.
47. See Lenhardt, supra note 3, at 62.
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of race on the ground. The Supreme Court's aspirational color-blindness
mantra may appeal to some.48 But no one can deny that-insofar as it
represents the product that courts provide in this area-it offers few meaningful
ways to deal with the racial division and separation that still pervades much of
American society.49 Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Grutter v.
Bollinger, which recognized achieving the educational benefits of broad
diversity as a compelling interest, provides a rare example of the Court
acknowledging what de facto racial segregation in housing or education might
mean for particular groups on the ground, not to mention our democracy as a
whole.
50
Localities, in contrast, are intimately involved with how race is lived or
"used" everyday. 5 1 Through the programs and institutions that they operate,
cities and other local government entities have specific, localized information
about the existence of persistent racial disparities, not to mention the impact
such inequalities have on the set of opportunities particular groups enjoy, and
the extent to which differentials in access to public goods such as education or
housing limit the ability of racial minorities and others to participate actively in
their communities. Increasingly, as suggested earlier, the dynamics of the
modem color line also have concrete effects on a locality's ability to improve
its economic prospects. 53 It would be hard to imagine an entity with better
information or raw capacity to make the kind of changes, policy alterations,
and cross-jurisdictional collaborations necessary to generate the kind of
innovations in the race context that users in the intellectual property area now
48. On colorblindness, see L6pez, supra note 11, at 988 (discussing, inter alia,
conflicting visions of colorblindness as a future goal of society and "as a means to achieve
this end").
49. Indeed, some argue that this reality accounts, inter alia, for Justice Kennedy's
separate opinion in Parents Involved, which went to great lengths to reject the plurality's
contention that seeking to address racial isolation in our public schools should not be
regarded as a compelling governmental interest for purposes of strict scrutiny. See Kimani
Paul-Emile, The Use of Race in Biomedical Science 31-34 (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author) (discussing Kennedy's Parents Involved concurrence and asserting the
existence of a strain of "racial pragmatism" in certain areas of existing equal protection
doctrine).
50. 539 U.S. 306, 331 (2003). Notably, Grutter found the Court willing to defer to the
expertise of education officials, rather than local government officials, and then only on a
theory that had earlier been proposed by a member of the Supreme Court, former Justice
Lewis Powell. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317 (1978)
(articulating diversity theory for admissions).
51. See Lenhardt, supra note 3, at 43.
52. For a discussion of opportunity deficits stemming from racial inequality and new
efforts to map opportunity differentials between racial minorities and others, see KIRWAN
INST. FOR THE STUDY OF RACE AND ETHNICITY, COMMUNITIES OF OPPORTUNITY: A
FRAMEWORK FOR A MORE EQUITABLE AND SUSTAINABLE FUTURE FOR ALL (2007), available
at http://www.racialequitytools.org/resourcefiles/powell l.pdf.
53. See WEISSBOURD, supra note 14, at 4, 5.
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facilitate. 54 The potential for productive, equality and democracy-enhancing
benefits that localities have in this regard rivals the societal and cultural
benefits that we seek to promote through intellectual property law.
55
The loose analogy drawn here admittedly falls short of perfect. Among
other things, localities are as much producers of goods as they are users of
court doctrine. Further, the incentives that localities and individual users have
for innovation are quite different. Users of software and other technology,
while perhaps willing to "reveal" or share their innovations with others, 56 often
make modifications to goods to serve their own individual needs. 57 A locality
might experiment with new strategies to deal with social problems to improve
its bottom line, but it does so with a clear understanding of the implications
such strategies will have for the residents for whom it has responsibility and to
whom it has certain obligations. Still, I think the user-innovation analogy I
have drawn here is helpful. When situated within legal scholarship on
"democratic experimentalism," which contemplates the decentralization of
power to enable local actors and citizens to "utilize their local knowledge to fit
solutions to their individual circumstances," it speaks more directly to the kind
of institutional innovation I hope to encourage in the race context.
5 8
Democratic experimentalism seeks to "reduc[e] the distance between...
the Madisonian ideal of a limited government assured by a complex division of
powers and . . . the governmental reality characteristic of the New Deal
synthesis, in which an all-powerful Congress delegates much of its authority to
expert agencies that are checked by the courts . ... 59 Scholars writing in this
area have, for example, emphasized the possibilities that an experimentalist
approach characterized by flexible procedures and "ongoing stakeholder
participation and measured accountability" can have for meaningful reform of
institutions such as schools, welfare organization, prisons, and even some
private workplaces.60 Notably, matters of racial inequity and disadvantage have
54. Admittedly, localities or regional entities, might, in circumstances lack the legal
power necessary to institute certain reforms. But, as I argue elsewhere, it seems that they
could productively solicit state legislatures to provide whatever authority necessary to move
forward with new policies and seek additional support from federal entities. See Lenhardt,
supra note 3, at 38. On the necessary relationship between localities and other governmental
entities, see David J. Barron, A Localist Critique of the New Federalism, 51 DuKE L.J. 377,
378-79 (2001).
55. On the kinds of benefits intellectual property law seeks to promote, see, e.g.,
Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 719, 731 (2009).
56. VON HIPPEL, supra note 30, at 77-91.
57. Id. at 19-20.
58. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 267 (1998).
59. Id. at 268.
60. Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law
Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1019 (2004).
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generally not been widely discussed.61 This literature, nevertheless, points to
how one might extend more fully the concept of democratic experimentalism to
matters of race. Embracing the user-innovation analogy would be useful to the
extent that the analogy highlights the uniquely oppositional positions arguably
held by courts and localities with respect to some issues in the race context and
the advantages that might accompany loosening the grip that courts now have
on strategies for change--of course, without eliminating their institutional
oversight and review roles.
Looking to local governments, rather than merely courts, to be "equality
innovators" that provide solutions to problems such as hypersegregation and
the negative effects it has for racial minorities in a range of areas would, as
experimentalists urge, help reinvigorate Madisonian conceptions of local
entities and their capacity to be incubators of solutions driven by local
knowledge and insights that produce broad benefits at the community level.62
The deep skepticism with which the Court has regarded race-conscious
initiatives like those at issue in Parents Involved, for example, cannot easily be
reconciled with the view, articulated by the framers, that "the most effective
democracy occurs at local levels of government, where people with firsthand
knowledge of local problems have more ready access to public officials
responsible for dealing with them. '63 The proposal to regard localities as
"equality innovators," in contrast, resonates deeply with democratic values
about local engagement and the position-increasingly advocated by scholars
such as Gerald Frug-that cities and other localities can serve as important
vehicles for community building and belonging. 64
II. JUDICIAL CONSTRAINTS ON INNOVATION IN THE RACE CONTEXT
Existing doctrine, as I noted at the outset, does not encourage "equality
innovation" or the new policies and creative regional alliances that I envision
localities committed to addressing structural racial inequality generating. As I
have previously observed, it essentially places localities in a no-win situation:
"refuse ever to consider race and allow racial inequity and segregation to
flourish, or consider race and risk running afoul of current law." 65 Even where
existing cases do not actually foreclose a particular strategy, the reality is that
the Supreme Court's negative stance toward local initiatives to combat the
61. Susan Sturm's excellent work on second-generation race and gender
discrimination in employment provides an important exception. See Sturm, supra note 21.
62. See Sabel & Simon, supra note 60, at 1100-01.
63. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 575 n.18 (1985)
(Powell, J., dissenting).
64. See GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING CITIES WITHOUT BUILDING WALLS
9(1999).
65. Lenhardt, supra note 3, at 7.
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cumulative effects of racial segregation and inequity arguably has the effect of
stifling creativity for many in this area.66 Localities not overly concerned about
potential liability under the unforgiving standard of strict scrutiny applied in all
cases involving race may-because of the very narrow set of options existing
doctrine sets out for meaningful engagement with the effects of structural
racism-simply lack the inspiration to develop truly innovative programs.
Together, Parents Involved and Ricci express clear disdain for initiatives that
try to wrestle with problems such as resegregation in public schools or
residential areas which, at a surface level, appear to have more to do with
individual choices and preferences, rather than identifiable government
policies. "The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race," Chief Justice
Roberts declared in his Parents Involved plurality opinion, "is to stop
discriminating on the basis of race."
67
The only area of settled case law that remotely reflects the ethic of
experimentation and innovation that I think we should be promoting in the race
context relates to so-called race-neutral alternatives. 68 Because racial
classifications of any sort raise serious concerns under existing doctrine,69 the
Court requires state actors to pursue race-neutral alternatives before utilizing
racial classifications.70 In writing the majority opinion upholding the University
of Michigan Law School's race-conscious admission program in Grutter v.
Bollinger, Justice O'Connor explained what the mandate to consider
alternatives entails:
Narrow tailoring does not require exhaustion of every conceivable race-
neutral alternative. Nor does it require a university to choose between
maintaining a reputation for excellence or fulfilling a commitment to provide
educational opportunities to members of all racial groups. . . . Narrow
tailoring does, however, require serious, good faith consideration of workable
race-neutral alternatives that will achieve the diversity the university seeks.
72
On the surface, the exhortation to engage in "good faith consideration of
workable race-neutral alternatives" appears to be a call for experimentation.
73
But the reality is quite different. It has functioned, first and foremost, as a
restraint on government decision making, rather than a license to innovate. In
66. See SPANN, supra note 12, at 192.
67. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748
(2007) (plurality opinion).
68. See Boddie, supra note 17, at 12-14 (discussing race-neutral alternatives and
arguing that the Court's Ricci decision did not change fundamentally what constitutes race-
neutrality). But see Adams, supra note 17, at 858 (contending that Ricci arguably stands for
the proposition that merely considering race can constitute race-conscious decision making).
69. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 720 (plurality opinion).
70. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339-40 (2003).
71. Id. at 306.
72. Id. at 339 (citation omitted).
73. Id.
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Supreme Court affirmative action cases, programs have almost always been
invalidated because conservative majorities have, from the bench, determined
that government decision makers on the ground could have pursued additional
alternatives before resorting to use of race-conscious measures. 74 Grutter,
which approved the University of Michigan Law School's race-conscious
admissions program even though the Law School had not first exhausted every
possible race-neutral alternative, 75 represents a departure, at least in terms of
outcome, from earlier cases that, as Chief Justice Roberts strongly signals in
Parents Involved, the Court will likely not soon repeat. 76 At least in the near
term, it seems that we can expect it to continue to ask government entities to
engage in the shot-in-the-dark experimentation that the vague requirement that
race-neutral alternatives be pursued encourages.
Justice Kennedy's much-discussed concurrence in Parents Involved
arguably provides a better, though as of yet doctrinally indeterminate, avenue
for greater creativity on the part of localities. Kennedy joined a majority of
Justices in concluding, among other things, that the Seattle and Louisville
school assignment programs at issue in Parents Involved were not narrowly
tailored. He wrote a separate concurrence, however, to articulate a different
conception of racial injury and the appropriate role of local governments in
addressing inequality than that described in Chief Justice Roberts's plurality
opinion.77 First, Justice Kennedy expressed the position, shared by four
dissenters, that "seek[ing] to reach Brown's objective of equal educational
opportunity" constitutes a legitimate. governmental purpose, a proposition
Roberts squarely rejected.78 More importantly for our purposes, he also
specified a list of race-conscious decisions that, in his view, schools could
make without invoking strict scrutiny--e.g., "strategic site selection of new
schools; drawing attendance zones with... recognition of the demographics of
neighborhoods; allocating resources for special programs; recruiting students
and faculty ... ; and tracking enrollments, performance, and other statistics by
race." 79 For Justice Kennedy, such initiatives carried no risk of racial injury
because, although they require acknowledgement of race, they do not require
officials explicitly to classify individuals on the basis of racial background.8 °
He explained that, in his estimation, they are different in kind from programs
74. See Ian Ayers & Sydney Foster, Don't Tell, Don't Ask: Narrow Tailoring After
Grutter and Gratz, 85 TEX. L. REV. 517, 522 n.25 (2007) (listing cases where a failure to
consider race-neutral alternatives was deemed problematic).
75. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 340.
76. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 724-25.
77. Goodwin Liu, "History Will Be Heard": An Appraisal of the Seattle/Louisville
Decision, 2 HARV. L. & POL'y REV. 53, 66 (2008).
78. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 788 (Kennedy, J., concurring). See id. at 732-33,
747.
79. Id. at 789.
80. Id.
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that expressly require the application of racial classifications, which, in his
estimation, should be subject to the most exacting scrutiny.
8 1
It remains to be seen whether the kind of initiatives Justice Kennedy
envisions will be adopted on a large scale by local officials or, for that matter,
how they will be received by his colleagues on the Court. It certainly seems
likely that the Parents Involved dissenters would agree with Justice Kennedy
on a limited basis, even as they push for less constrained local decision making
in this area. Even so, for someone that, as I do, envisions a broader-though,
importantly, not unfettered-berth for "equality innovators," Justice Kennedy's
proposal represents only a limited solution to an exceedingly complex problem.
III. STRUCTURAL APPROACHES TO RACIAL INEQUALITY
The previous Parts admittedly paint a rather grim picture of current
doctrine and the constraints that it places on localities interested in adopting
strategies to address structural racial inequalities. Legal scholars have proposed
attractive alternatives to the Court's current approach to race.s2 For prospective
local "equality innovators, however, the question, is whether, in the current
moment, when the adoption of such alternatives seems unlikely, room exists to
adopt creative approaches to the structural problems that attend the color line in
their jurisdictions.
This Part answers that question in the affirmative. In an effort to
encourage equality innovation, it seeks to identify the opportunities for
experimentation and change that exist, notwithstanding the real limitations
posed by current doctrine. This Part begins by briefly discussing innovative
regulatory devices focused on the mechanisms through which structural racial
inequality endures in the United States. It then outlines a proposal for the
creation and implementation of an evaluative measure called the race audit that
could productively be deployed by local jurisdictions. First developed in an
article in the Hastings Law Journal, the race audit proposal seeks to be
responsive to legal scholarship on structuralism and to the growing chorus of
scholars who maintain that research emphasizing the measurement of
"discrimination from one point in time and in one domain" is simply
"insufficient to identify the overall impact of discrimination on individuals.
81. Id.
82. See, e.g., Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit
Bias and the Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 465 (2010) (behavioral realism); Linda Hamilton
Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and
Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995) (cognitive bias); Lawrence,
supra note 11 (unconscious racism); R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma,
and Equality in Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 803 (2004) (racial stigma).
83. See Lenhardt, supra note 3.
84. PANEL ON METHODS FOR ASSESSING DISCRIMINATION, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
MEASURING RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 246 (Rebecca M. Blank, Marilyn Dabady & Constance
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A. Existing Regulatory Innovations
As previously noted, structuralist accounts of race and inequality focus
on the cumulative effects of systems and structures that, over time, work to
reinforce racial disadvantage. 85 Existing regulatory devices in the race context,
however, still typically retain a focus on intentionality. 86 For example, widely
deployed tools such as housing audits, which collect data about the incidence
of residential discrimination through a "paired testing methodology where
black and white auditors" approach real estate agents and record any
differences in treatment or access to rental opportunities, 87 generally have
uncovering intentional discrimination as their primary goal.
This said, noteworthy local, state, and federal regulatory initiatives
reflecting structuralist insights exist. For example, at the state and local level, a
number of jurisdictions have begun to require the completion of impact
statements designed, among other things, to identify racial disparities in a
particular domain.88 States such as Connecticut, Iowa, and Minnesota, for
example, recently enacted legislation requiring impact statements to detail• 89
disparities in criminal sentencing. Likewise, some localities have also
adopted other similar devices to measure the possible effect of government
action. These include educational impact statements or fair share provisions for
siting public facilities, such as those that have been adopted by New York
City. 90 A 2003 study of Mebane, North Carolina, and the cumulative effects of
F. Citro eds., 2004).
85. powell, supra note 21, at 796.
86. Id.
87. Douglas S. Massey & Rebecca M. Blank, Assessing Racial Discrimination:
Methods and Measures, in FRAGILE RIGHTS WITHIN CITIES: GOVERNMENT, HOUSING, AND
FAIRNESS 61, 69 (John Goering ed., 2007). Some research has also been completed in the
area of home ownership. See Margery Austin Turner & Stephen L. Ross, How Racial
Discrimination Affects the Search for Housing, in THE GEOGRAPHY OF OPPORTUNITY: RACE
AND HOUSING CHOICE IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA 81, 83-85 (Xavier de Souza Briggs ed.,
2005).
88. Such statements take inspiration from environmental impact statements, which
have become prevalent in helping to assess the potential environmental impacts of proposed
projects. See Amy L. Stein, Climate Change Under NEPA: Avoiding Cursory Consideration
of Greenhouse Gases, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 473 (2010) (discussing environmental impact
statements).
89. See Catherine London, Racial Impact Statements: A Proactive Approach to
Addressing Racial Disparities in Prison Populations, 29 LAW & INEQ. 211, 212-14 (2011).
90. See William Valletta, Siting Public Facilities on a Fair Share Basis in New York
City, 25 URB. LAW. 1 (1993) (discussing city fair share provisions). Significantly, San
Francisco passed an audit-like device focused on issues of gender in the 1990s in an effort to
implement the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women. See Stacy Laira Lozner, Note, Diffusion of Local
Regulatory Innovations: The San Francisco CEDAW Ordinance and the New York City
Human Rights Initiative, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 768 (2004); Catherine Powell, Dialogic
Federalism: Constitutional Possibilities for Incorporation of Human Rights Law in the
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annexation, sewer placement, and highway relocation efforts also provides a
very useful example.
91
At the federal level, important models geared at structural inequality
can also be found. The much-criticized federal No Child Left Behind Act
(NCLB)-which requires public schools both to collect data on racial
disparities and to develop strategies for reducing them-stands out as an
important example. 92 Other models can be found in juvenile justice provisions
passed by Congress and even the recent stimulus act.
93
As I indicate elsewhere, however, programs now implemented by the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the Department of
Transportation (DOT) arguably provide the best examples of federal initiatives
geared toward structural inequality. 94 HUD regulations--consistent with the
"affirmatively furthering" requirement of the Fair Housing Act-currently
require state and local grantees of consolidated civil rights programs to
conduct, inter alia, an analysis of the impediments to fair housing choice and
"comprehensive review of ... [applicable] laws, regulations, and
administrative policies, procedures, and practices" and their impact on "the
accessibility of housing. 95 DOT provisions seeking to ensure compliance with
United States, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 245, 245-46 (2001).
91. See CEDAR GROVE INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE CMTYS., ADDRESSING RACIAL
DISPARITIES IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACTIONS: THE MEBANE CASE STUDY (2003), available
at http://www.cedargroveinst.org/files/mebanecase.pdf.
92. Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Disparity Rules, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 374, 417 (2007);
James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, The Federal No Child Left Behind Act and the Post-
Desegregation Civil Rights Agenda, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1703, 1723 (2003); ; see also Kimberly
West-Faulcon, The River Runs Dry: When Title VI Trumps State Anti-Affirmative Action
Laws, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1075 (2009) (addressing remedy under NCLB).
93. See Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Stimulus and Civil Rights, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 154,
193 (2011). The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDP) requires state
recipients of federal juvenile justice funds to "implement strategies to reduce disparities in
the confinement rates of minority juveniles where those disparities are found to exist."
Johnson, supra note 92, at 378. The relevant disproportionate minority contact standard, like
provisions in the NCLB, addresses the information problem that usually attends the causes
of persistent racial inequalities by mandating that states collect and make available to others
any evidence of race-based disparity in the area ofjuvenile justice. Id. at 379.
94. Lenhardt, supra note 3, at 27.
95. 1 U.S. DEP'T OF HoUs. AND URBAN DEV., HUD-1582B-FHEO, FAIR HOUSING
PLANNING GUIDE, at 2-7 (1996), available at
http://www.hud.gov/offices/fheo/images/fhpg.pdf; Henry Korman, Underwriting for Fair
Housing? Achieving Civil Rights Goals in Affordable Housing Programs, 14 J. AFFORDABLE
HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEv. L. 292, 299 (2005). Section 3608 of the Fair Housing Act
(FHA) requires that the Secretary "administer the programs and activities relating to housing
and urban development in a manner affirmatively to further the policies" of that statute. 42
U.S.C. § 3608(e)(5) (2006). The FHA does not give content to the "affirmatively furthering"
mandate, but has been interpreted broadly to include not only combating intentional
discrimination in housing, but advancing integrative efforts capable of increasing
opportunities and minimizing segregation in minority communities. See Michelle Ghaznavi
Collins, Note, Opening Doors to Fair Housing: Enforcing the Affirmatively Further
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the nondiscrimination mandate of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
engage funding recipients in a similar inquiry into the possible sources of
inequity.96 Applicable regulations contemplate, among other things, an in-depth
inquiry into "significant system-wide service and fare changes and proposed
improvements.., to determine whether those changes have a discriminatory
impact" on minority communities. 97 These programs stand out for the deep,
multi-pronged inquiry into the sources of inequality that they facilitate. Also
significant, for our purposes, is the extent to which they regard local
jurisdictions as important partners in efforts to eliminate barriers to substantive
racial equality and opportunity.
B. A Modest Proposal: The Race Audit Device
This Part outlines an evaluative mechanism called the race audit. The
audit proposal reflects structuralist and experimentalist insights, but also draws
on business management scholarship on corporate social responsibility and
"social audits." Notably, this scholarship has not only conceived of such
devices as tools for, inter alia, evaluating the performance of corporate entities
along vectors such as mission, environmental impact, or contributions to social
change.98 It has sometimes also understood them to be mechanisms for
generating empirical knowledge relevant to conversations about the conditions
necessary for "the good life." 99
The purpose of the race audit proposal, which reflects a similar
understanding, is to provide empirical information about the operation of race,
at a structural level, in particular jurisdictions. Unlike existing regulatory
devices, which typically focus on a single area, it envisions a multi-domain-
e.g., education as well as housing or employment-inquiry into the extent to
which local systems and structures, to include public entity entanglements with
private entities, have contributed to ongoing racial disparities and spatial
Provision of the Fair Housing Act Through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 2135,
2143 (2010).
96. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., FTA C 4702.1A, TITLE V1 AND TITLE VI-DEPENDENT
GUIDELINES FOR FEDERAL TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION RECIPIENTS, at It- 1 (2007), available at
http://www.fta.dot.gov/documents/Title VI Circular 4702.1 A.pdf.
97. Id. at V-5. Millions of dollars in stimulus funds were recently denied to Bay Area
Regional Transit after an administrative Title VI action brought by community activists
demonstrated that the agency had not adequately considered an extension project's
environmental impact and service to minority communities. Johnson, supra note 93, at 193.
98. See Homer H. Johnson, Corporate Social Audits-This Time Around, 44 Bus.
HORIzoNs 29, 32 (2001); see also Archie B. Carroll & George W. Beiler, Landmarks in the
Evolution of the Social Audit, 18 ACAD. MGMT. J. 589, 590-96 (1975).
99. See Craig Mackenzie, Ethical Auditing and Ethical Knowledge, 17 J. Bus. ETHICS
1395, 1397 (1998); see also Lenhardt, supra note 3, at 49. This focus aligns nicely with a
focus on Democratic experimentalism. See Brandon L. Garrett & James S. Liebman,
Experimentalist Equal Protection, 22 YALE L. & POL'y REV. 261 (2004).
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segregation. In generating information, the race audit-which could be utilized
by single localities or by a group of localities seeking regional solutions to
inequality within a broad regional area-will offer a narrative about the source
of racial disadvantage in our communities very different from that now
generated by tools focused on intentional discrimination.'0 0 It will also
complement exciting work on opportunity mapping and other similar efforts to
identify the exact dimensions of inequality,10' as well as point to new strategies
that might be deployed at the local level to more effectively address durable
racial inequality.
Under the proposal, local governments interested in understanding and
possibly developing innovative solutions to persistent racial inequality within
their borders would voluntarily commission a race audit. Audit implementation
would not, however, be solely their responsibility. Instead, I envision the audits
being conducted by "communities of inquiry," in conjunction with local
officials and community leaders. 102 In essence, a locality would invite
community leaders and a wide range of stakeholders to participate in
developing and implementing the audit process, something that would help to
ensure its integrity and the accountability of those involved. As I have
previously explained, academics-e.g., law professors, but also historians,
sociologists, urban planners, and philosophers-would be essential participants
in the audit process given the problems inherent in developing measures for
cumulative disadvantage and the need for understanding issues of equity over
time. 103 Community groups, civil rights organizations and other non-
governmental organizations, philanthropic entities, businesses, religious
organizations, and the officials and employees of local agencies would also be
essential participants. 104 At some level, the audit committee would function like
the civil equivalent of a citizens' grand jury.105 In conducting its affairs, the
"community of inquiry" would, of course, be attuned to any information
regarding intentional discrimination. But, such information would not be the
primary target of auditing efforts. Obtaining evidence pertaining to systems or
procedures that create and perpetuate cumulative racial disadvantage sits
highest atop the priorities to be served by the race audit.
100. Lenhardt, supra note 3, at 8.
101. See KIRWAN INST., supra note 52.
102. See Mackenzie, supra note 99, at 1399-1400; see also Susan Sturm, The
Architecture of Inclusion: Advancing Workplace Equity in Higher Education, 29 HARV. J. L.
& GENDER 247, 294 (2006) (discussing the importance of productive collaborations in
thinking about workplace diversity in higher education).
103. See Kavasseri V. Ramanathan, Toward a Theory of Corporate Social Accounting,
51 ACCT. REV. 516, 526 (1976); see also Lenhardt, supra note 3, at 41-42.
104. See Lenhardt, supra note 3, at 41-42.
105. See Kevin K. Washburn, Restoring the Grand Jury, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2333
(2008) (discussing the importance of grand juries and ideas for reforming the current grand
jury system).
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In the first instance, the stakeholders on the audit committee would-as
a way of "arriv[ing] at an operational definition of the role of a ... [locality] in
its broader social context" 06-- establish, through a process of experimentation
and negotiation, a set of audit criteria and objectives responsive to the unique
social context of the jurisdiction.10 7 While the criteria and objectives utilized
would necessarily vary by jurisdiction, macro-level criteria would give some
indication of what we think local governments should be doing in the area of
race. 10 8 They might, for example, institute an inquiry along the following lines:
* To what extent do/have the local government's spatial
arrangements and policies impede/d the ability of racial
minorities fully to realize opportunities in areas such as
education, employment, housing, health, and intimacy?
" What are the intergenerational wealth, social capital, and
participation effects of the local government's past and present
structures and systems? 1
09
Micro-level criteria would, in contrast, emphasize factors necessary to
determine how specific agencies have performed along certain vectors.
Consider this small sample:
1 0
* Have agency procedures, policies, and/or decision making
worked, intentionally or unintentionally, to exclude racial
minorities economically, socially, spatially, or politically?
* Have agency procedures, policies, and/or decision making
created or perpetuated negative meanings about race, or
disproportionately affected minorities in their ability to move
freely within the jurisdiction or participate in community affairs
at a social or political level?
1 II
Finally, the audit objectives identified by the "community of inquiry"
would draw on assumptions embedded in the criteria just identified.' 12 Such
objectives might include:
* To clarify the obligations of the local government with respect to
the fair and equitable treatment of racial minorities and others
across various life domains and spatial contexts.
* To provide a formal account of the structural dimensions of
106. Ramanathan, supra note 103, at 518.
107. Seeid at518-19.
108. Id. at 518; see also Lenhardt, supra note 3, at 22.
109. Lenhardt, supra note 3, at 22. For a more comprehensive set of criteria, see id at
22-23.
110. See id. at 22-23 (discussing similar micro-level criteria in social accounting
context).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 23.
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racial inequality and disadvantage within the local government
over time that can be distributed to local stakeholders and
constituents in multiple forms. 13
Having determined the objectives and criteria for the evaluation
process, the audit team would then collect and analyze historical documents,
surveys, maps, demographic information, interviews, empirical data, and
administrative regulations, among other things."1 4 But, consistent with the
vision articulated by business management scholars concerned with the social
audit, my strong sense is that an inquiry of this sort could ultimately be about
much more than the gathering of discrete pieces of evidence. As I intimated
previously, I envision the race audit serving as a vehicle for increased
knowledge about the locality and the operation of race within its borders.
1 15
Audit committee members would effectively be tasked with developing a
theory of race in the area and the particular causes of "categorical inequality"
in the jurisdiction. 16 That theory would offer a way of tracing the ways in
which the stratification achieved was adapted over time and emulated by
organizations and officials within the system, as well as individuals residing in
the jurisdiction. 117
Likewise, it would enable efforts to determine with some level of
specificity the exploitative effects of categorical racial stratification."' So, an
individual city-level inquiry might result in a public report or presentation to
core constituent groups within the relevant city or state that documents how
racial violence or racial covenants restricting racial minorities to particular
areas within a metropolis decades before might, because of various zoning
decisions made on the basis of residence, account for the concentration of
landfills or hazardous waste facilities within minority neighborhoods." 9 A
regional inquiry-which would highlight even more the extent to which racial
segregation is "perpetuated by the social and political construction of racially
identified political space"120--mght reveal the ways in which suburban
communities utilized exclusionary zoning rules that locked minorities in
declining inner-city neighborhoods and under-resourced schools, and facilitated
the use of discriminatory practices by private entities such as realtors or
businesses.'
2 1
113. Id.
114. See Mackenzie, supra note 99, at 1397-98.
115. See Sturm, supra note 102, at 290-92.
116. See Mackenzie, supra note 99, at 1397-98.
117. TILLY, supra note 21, at 92-98.
118. See Lenhardt, supra note 3, at 19-20 (discussing Tilly's and Massey's work on
durable inequality).
119. Seeid. at3l.
120. Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal
Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1849 (1994).
121. See Lenhardt, supra note 3, at 36.
LOCALITIES AS EQUALITYINNOVATORS
In sum, the audit process just described would have many advantages.
While it envisions localities at the center of efforts to grapple with the effects
of structural racial inequality, it leaves room for meaningful partnerships with
other entities, including states and the federal government. As Subpart III.C.
explains, both state and federal agencies could be an important source of
funding for race audit initiatives. States will likely also be instrumental in
ensuring that localities have the governmental powers necessary to conduct the
audit. 122
C. Developing Better Solutions for Structural Racial Inequality
The previous Subpart provides only a very cursory picture of the race
audit process. Elsewhere I describe what this process might involve in greater
detail, noting, among other things, the role that states and the federal
government might play in empowering localities to implement the race audit
proposal. 123 Still, even this snapshot hopefully helps to make clear some of the
benefits of the model I set out. It underscores the opportunities for meaningful
change and innovation in the race context.
For decades now, the focus in the area of civil rights has largely been on
national solutions to racial inequality, particularly those driven by federal
courts, but without any long-lasting returns. The race audit breaks this
unproductive reliance by pivoting away from the national to the local, and from
a focus on the intentionality emphasized in current court doctrine to structural
concerns. 124 Importantly, though, it achieves this shift without necessitating the
adoption of a new theory of or approach to equal protection. The race audit, I
submit, holds promise in part because it achieves meaningful innovation in
thinking about the sources of persistent racial inequality while safely
navigating within the boundaries of the current doctrinal landscape. Because it
does not draw classifications on the basis of race in its implementation, the
audit device does not run afoul of the strict scrutiny doctrine or the color-
blindness norms that undergird it.' 25 While there is some sense in which the
proposed mechanism's purpose-understanding the sources of structural
inequality-is deeply entangled with matters of race, this fact, as Justice
Kennedy's concurrence in Parents Involved and recognition of remedying
racial isolation as compelling interest makes clear, does not prove fatal under
current doctrine. 126 Indeed, were it to be deemed so, any number of
governmental programs requiring the collection of data on race and racial
122. See id. at 38 (discussing in greater detail the role that state and federal
governmental agencies might play in supporting race audit efforts).
123. See id.
124. Id. at 29.
125. See id. at 39.
126. Boddie, supra note 17, at 2-3, 10.
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minorities, including the IUD and DOT programs described above, would
arguably be in jeopardy.127
Even more, the race audit opens the door to rethinking existing
strategies not just to map but actually to address racial inequality.
Implementation of the race audit model I propose does not mandate that a
locality take the additional step of developing solutions for any problem the
audit process might uncover. The race audit may be conducted solely for the
truth telling and knowledge it promotes. This said, an audit likely would point
to interventions that could interrupt the processes leading to racial stratification
in productive ways. As other scholars have noted, we can learn a great deal
about what is necessary to achieve inclusion by learning about the mechanisms
for exclusion.1
28
In thinking about potential strategies, the temptation will be to focus
solely on the question whether race audits would provide sufficient evidence of
discrimination to justify the consideration of race by a local government. The
question, while important, misses one of the advantages of the race audit
mechanism. By looking closely at the macro and micro operations of race in a
given jurisdiction, the race audit will help to identify the inequality-reinforcing
systems and procedures of the locality. In so doing, it will also help to
determine specific, race-neutral interventions that can be adopted by individual
cities or multiple localities within a regional area to interrupt the structural
processes that foster inequality. 129 Such strategies would arguably find support
from Justice Kennedy and other justices, perhaps even some of those who
emphasized the dangers of race-conscious decision making in Parents Involved
and Ricci.1
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Targeted strategies mean that, rather than experimenting blindly with
such alternatives, as the Court's cases encourage, local governments can come
up with solutions to address identified problems. So, if a city's race audit
determines that reliance on landfill siting factors such as the low cost of
property or low population density has, in fact, contributed to cumulative
disadvantage, officials can resolve to identify different factors. 131 Perhaps they
will consider whether a community has its "fair share" of such facilities or
.. 132
what kinds of decisions would promote growth in areas of segregation.
Ultimately, they might conclude that race-conscious measures are necessary.
127. See Lenhardt, supra note 3, at 42-43.
128. Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the
Innovative Ideal, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 958 (1996).
129. See Lenhardt, supra note 3, at 42.
130. Lenhardt, supra note 3, at 4041.
131. LUKE W. COLE & SHEILA R. FOSTER, FROM THE GROUND UP: ENVIRONMENTAL
RACISM AND THE RISE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT 70-73 (2001) (discussing
factors contributing to overrepresentation of hazardous waste sites in minority communities).
132. See David Troutt, Katrina's Window: Localism, Resegregation, and Equitable
Regionalism, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 1109 (2008) (discussing fair share housing programs).
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But the point is that, with the race audit, such measures need not be the first
stop in attempting to remedy structural inequality. Localities can experiment
with other measures that have the potential not only to boost their bottom
line, 133 but also change, consistent with what I argue in the previous Subpart,
the understanding of what membership in their community means.
The race audit could also help to improve approaches to race-conscious
remedies and voluntary programs. It would help localities develop more
thoughtful remedial strategies. Where a jurist seems at least to be open to
entertaining the constitutionality of some race-conscious decision making, the
knowledge that a strategy was devised in accord with information from a
detailed, community-sponsored investigatory process might quell misgivings
about whether it uses race too much or too little to be regarded as thoughtful
for narrow tailoring purposes. 134 The race audit introduces a heightened level of
precision to the development of race-conscious strategies that will only benefit
governmental initiatives in this area.1
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D. Strengthening Local Incentives for Innovation
Even those intrigued by the race audit concept might be skeptical about
the willingness and ability of localities to implement it. Audit implementation
will, at a minimum, be quite involved and may reveal information that could, in
limited circumstances, expose the locality to potential liability. 136 It would be
133. WEISSBOURD, supra note 14, at 4-5.
134. Lenhardt, supra note 3, at 42.
135. Id. at 42. Significantly, implementation of the race audit might also have the
added benefit of "nudging" courts to rethink aspects of current doctrine. In particular, the
information about the systems and procedures that produce and sustain racial inequality
might be relevant to conversations about "societal discrimination." As previously noted, the
Supreme Court has dismissed societal discrimination, which also focuses on racial inequity,
as too amorphous a concept to satisfy doctrinal requirements pertaining to matters such as
causation. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). By helping
to uncover the sources and concrete effects of structural inequality, however, the race audit
might actually provide additional content to the notion of societal discrimination. Of course,
it seems unlikely that the conservative majorities that have won the day in recent cases will
be open to retreating on the Court's earlier position with respect to this problem. But there
are ways in which race audit data will make it more difficult to tow this line without
engaging more directly the ways in which government policies and practices might bear on
racial inequality.
136. The scope of any liability that a locality might face is arguably limited. For better
or for worse, the vast majority of claims that might be brought against a jurisdiction for
intentional discrimination will be time barred. See Suzzette Malveaux, Statutes of
Limitations: A Policy Analysis in the Context of Reparations Litigation, 74 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 68, 70-71 (2010). It will primarily only be evidence of current discrimination that will
expose localities to liability under existing law. Because such exposure has not been a
disincentive to local participation in initiatives such as the "Al" process sponsored by HUD,
it seems unlikely to prevent a large number of jurisdictions from considering race audit
implementation seriously. And, as I have previously suggested, where potential liability does
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easy to assume that these issues, along with the cost of the audit process, will
necessarily dissuade localities from electing to conduct the race audit. But
doing so would be a mistake.
As I have previously argued, the assumption that localities will be
unwilling to be proactive in addressing the structural racial inequality ignores
two important realities.' 37 First, contrary to what the typical incentives
argument suggests, it simply is not the case that the negative externalities of
persistent racial inequality flow only to minorities. They also affect local
governments. In many ways, the performance of local functions occurs on a
stage set by racial disadvantage. Localities appreciate this and understand that,
if they are to be effective in carrying out their mission, they must find ways to
deal with the extent to which persistent racial inequality affects everything
from public education to community development efforts. 3 8 Second, as Part III
attests, the truth is that many localities have already involved themselves in
efforts to address racial inequity. 39 Jurisdictions like Seattle and even New
Haven are deciding to throw themselves into the fray, to experiment actively
with possible solutions, even if it means risking exposure to liability. And the
reason this is so has to do with more than the individual calculus that a locality
might make about the risk.
Localities-whether urban, suburban, or rural-have real incentives to
try to experiment with solutions to the inequality that affects their citizens.
140
Some of these relate to their economic interests. While, as I have already
acknowledged, race audit implementation will not be without cost, what one
must keep in mind here is that the kind of racial disadvantage with which
localities must contend also carries concrete costs. 14 1 Research conducted by
Robert Weissbourd and others has begun to document such costs. 14 ' Even
more, this research underscores the fact that developing successful strategies to
eliminate the effects of racial inequality and disadvantage can actually serve to
improve a locality's financial situation.
143
Other incentives relate to compliance with existing racial norms. Even
where they have little fear of violating existing law, localities have strong
reasons to signal to their residents and potential residents, as well as other
localities, that they take issues of race and equality seriously. 144 At a normative
begin to dissuade jurisdictions from electing to conduct the race audit, states or the federal
government could opt to provide limited immunity for any official discrimination revealed
as a consequence of the audit process. See Lenhardt, supra note 3, at 38-39.
137. See Lenhardt, supra note 3, at 43-45.
138. See id
139. See supra pp. 279-81.
140. Lenhardt, supra note 3, at 44-45.
141. Id. at 45.
142. See WEISSBOURD, supra note 14, at 5.
143. Id. at 4.
144. See Lenhardt, supra note 3, at 44.
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level, a jurisdiction could reasonably conclude that, in the twenty-first century,
when the first African American President sits in the Oval Office, it should
make clear its awareness of and sensitivity to matters of race. Certainly, there
will be those jurisdictions where problems of racial discrimination still arise. 145
Indeed, there may also be those that subtly promote racial exclusivity by
subsidizing the development of gated communities and the like.146 But I submit
that we will be hard pressed to find many that openly celebrate their hostility to
racial minorities in the way that a Birmingham or Jackson did a generation ago.
Many jurisdictions will find it important at least to project compliance with
existing race norms. 14 7 At a minimum, some jurisdictions will conclude that
doing so might give them a competitive edge in attracting new residents,
including those who might add to racial diversity within their borders. 148
Significantly, the race audit proposal advanced above not only takes
account of incentives such as these, but could actually work to enhance them.
At present, we are operating at an innovation deficit when it comes to solutions
to inequality. As previously indicated, the emphasis placed on race-neutral
alternatives has not produced the experimentation and change one might hope
for in addressing persistent racial inequality.' 
49
The race audit responds to this situation by making clear that productive
experimentation and change is still possible, despite the limitations of current
doctrine. Jurisdictions, I argue, would likely be encouraged by evidence about a
tool that could be deployed to identify and possibly address the sources of such
inequity without running afoul of existing law. I would hope that there would
be some that would adopt the proposal advanced here. But there might be
others that would be inspired simply to develop their own new strategies,
something that, in my view, would prove equally beneficial.
Beyond this, the race audit offers opportunities for strengthening the
financial incentives that localities have for innovation in the race area. Earlier I
emphasized the incentive that a city or other locality, armed with data about the
costs of inequality, might have to adopt programs designed to eliminate
persistent racial inequality. But one can imagine localities being responsive to
other economic incentives, as well. In Subpart III.B., I noted the role that states
or the federal government might play in supporting localities in the race audit
145. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 15 (discussing racially discriminatory police-run
drug stings in Tulia, Texas).
146. See Mona Lynch, From the Punitive City to the Gated Community: Security and
Segregation Across the Social and Penal Landscape, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 89 (2001).
147. Lenhardt, supra note 3, at 45.
148. Interestingly, jurisdictions such as Shaker Heights, Ohio, and Maplewood and
South Orange, New Jersey, have previously used incentive programs to attract residents and
enhance racial diversity. See Eleanor Novek, Sidebar: The Value of Integration,
SHELTERFORCE, Mar.-Apr. 2001, available at
http://www.nhi.org/online/issues/l 16/PRISM.html.
149. See Lenhardt, supra note 3.
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process. One could easily imagine government or philanthropic programs that
provide direct support for race audit processes or, alternatively, that seek to
incentivize race audit implementation or innovation more broadly. Think, for
example, about the "Race to the Top" initiative that the Obama Administration
recently launched to encourage innovation in public schools. 150 That popular
program incentivized "systemic" approaches designed to "creat[e] the
conditions for education innovation and reform" by encouraging states to
compete for financial grants to be paid from approximately $4.35 billion in
stimulus funds.' 5' Localities could be encouraged to implement race audits or
other similar measures in much the same way. 152 A properly structured
program could enhance local incentives for innovation without requiring any
compromises on the quality of the initiatives proposed by localities.
5 3
CONCLUSION
For too long now, we have looked almost exclusively to courts for
creative solutions to the myriad problems that attend the American color line.
This Article has outlined the case for bringing cities and other localities to the
center of efforts to think deeply about the structural dimensions of racial
inequality. The race audit proposal described here provides one window on
what a world in which this goal has been accomplished might look like.
For reasons already articulated, I think that the proposal advanced is a
sound one with many potential benefits. Admittedly, though, this particular
forum has not made it possible to explore potential concerns about the audit
mechanism as fully as I have elsewhere. 54 In addition to matters of scope and
cost, reasonable concerns about the possibility that localities will abuse the
authority afforded them under the audit proposal in ways that deepen, not
minimize, racial disparities must be addressed. For good reasons, many will
find it difficult to excise the images of a 1960s Birmingham from their minds.
While not unsympathetic to such concerns, I find, as previously intimated,
comfort both in the existence of civil rights laws that were nonexistent when
Bull Connor attacked defenseless civil rights protesters and in the recognition
that the opportunities for abuse under the race audit are arguably no greater
than those that obtain in the many other contexts in which we permit localities
150. See Lenhardt, supra note 3, at 10.
151. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., RACE TO THE TOP EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2 (Nov. 2009),
available at http://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/executive-summary.pdf.
152. See Brian Galle & Joseph Leahy, Laboratories of Democracy? Policy Innovation
in Decentralized Governments, 58 EMORY L.J. 1333, 1361 (2009) (concluding that financial
incentives could help to minimize relevant externalities and ensure socially efficient levels
of government innovation).
153. See id. (noting, inter alia, that financial incentives might help to overcome
barriers to innovation identified in the work of Susan Rose-Ackerman).
154. See, e.g., Lenhardt, supra note 3, at 46-48.
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to make decisions regarding matters of race. 155 I acknowledge, however, that
without the more fulsome account of the argument for the race audit, others
might not.
Importantly, though, the primary point of the intervention made in this
Article has not been to make the case for the race audit per se. Rather, it has
been to support the general proposition that innovations in how we deal with
persistent racial inequality can be achieved-something we barely allow
ourselves to contemplate in the current doctrinal climate-and would have
positive social and democracy-enhancing benefits. Further, I have tried to make
the case that we need not, and arguably should not, rely exclusively on old civil
rights frameworks in pursuing them. In this sense, this Article is part of a larger
project to rethink the kind of commitments that underlie the strategies for
addressing inequality in the twenty-first century that race scholars and civil
rights advocates have embraced. I think it critical, for example, that race
scholars and civil rights advocates reexamine implicit assumptions about the
possibilities for reconciling principles such as equality and liberty. Fears about
what local power might mean for civil rights have produced a very narrow
focus on national, court-driven solutions for race. But it is not entirely clear to
me that, particularly in the current context, local solutions should be so quickly
overlooked.
Localities, because of their unique knowledge about how race is
experienced at the community level and intimate involvement in processes at
the heart of our democracy, have, as I have argued, the capacity to be important
change agents in the area of race. 156 The race audit proposal advanced in this
Article represents just one of arguably many ways that localities, if permitted
and sufficiently inspired, can be instrumental in both identifying and
remedying more effectively cumulative racial disadvantage. It helps to make
clear that localities can be important "equality innovators" in their own right. In
making this assertion, I mean to suggest not only that localities could be
instrumental in helping us to resolve racial disparities, but also that they might
be productively engaged in sharpening the stories we tell about how race
operates in our society. They might also be enlisted to help encourage
community-level conversations focused on providing greater content to core
concepts like equality. 157 Such discussions could produce attractive substantive
alternatives to the very thin, formalistic account of equality advanced in recent
Supreme Court cases. As other scholars note, some precedent for including
localities in constitutional interpretation of this variety exists. 58 Even more,
after decades of relying on courts alone for answers about how best to address
155. Id. at 46.
156. See id. at 49.
157. See id.
158. See David J. Barron, The Promise of Cooley's City: Traces of Local
Constitutionalism, 147 U. PA. L. REv. 487, 572 (1999).
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the color line, I submit that the prospect of generating democratic conversations
about race and the meaning of belonging in our society at the local level should
be very attractive indeed.
